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Abstract 
 
Title:  Underwritten Rights Issues - A study of the price of using underwriters on  
 the Swedish market. 
Seminar date: 2014-06-03/04 
Course: BUSN89 Degree Project in Corporate and Financial Management - Master 
 Level 
Authors: Per Bergelin and Truls Browall 
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen 
Key words: Rights Issues, Options Theory, Underwriting, Excess Return 
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to see if companies pay too much to 
underwriters when making rights issues. The result is later compared with 
previous studies in the same subject to see if the Swedish market differ  
 from other international markets. 
Methodology: The method used is a quantitative approach with the use of Black and  
 Scholes options theory. 
Theoretical  The theoretical framework covers both financial theories like: market  
framework: signaling theory and pecking order theory as well as a literature review of 
 previous studies. 
Empirical foundation: There is an initial sample of all firms who conducted a rights issue during 
the years 2008-2013 on the exchanges Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, NGM  
 Equity and AktieTorget.  
Conclusions: Overall, there is an excess return to underwriters on the Swedish market  
as in line with most of the previous studies conducted on other markets. 
There is a difference between the three different exchanges on the 
Swedish market where Nasdaq OMX Stockholm have the most excess 
return to underwriters, while NGM Equity do not have any excess return 
to underwriters. Further there is a significant difference between the 
compensations paid by companies when making a defensive or offensive 
rights issue where companies paying more when making a defensive rights 
issue.  
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Dictionary: 
 
Compensation fee: The compensation the company pays to the underwriter, often a percentage of 
the guaranteed amount the underwriter take on. In the presence of compensation fee, the 
underwriter gets paid no matter if he needs to buy shares or not. 
 
Contract unit: A contract in which the amount of the underlying asset is represented by an option 
contract. 
 
Excess return: The extra money a company pays and the underwriter gets because the 
compensation exceeds the price it would had been in an efficient market. 
 
Guaranteed amount: The amount an underwriter commits to subscribe for the shares that were 
offered but not subscribed by shareholders. 
 
Rights issue: When a company issues new shares to the market to raise money.  
 
Sub-underwriter: Acts as an insurer for the underwriter. 
 
Underwriter: A person/company/bank that commits to buy shares that is not subscribed in a 
rights issue. 
 
Underwriter agreement: The agreement between the company making a rights issue and an 
underwriter who guarantees that a certain percentage/amount gets subscribed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the introductory chapter the reader gets introduced to a background in the subject and to the 
problem underlying the purpose of this study. The delimitations that are used for the data 
collection and the study are further presented as well as an outline for the complete study.  
 
 
2013 was a record year in the amount of rights issues made on the Swedish market, with an 
increase of 50 percent compared to the same period in 2012 (Dn.se, 2014-01-09). As more 
companies are making rights issues there has also been an increasing use of underwriters. 
Underwritten rights issues are something that began to emerge in the late 1990´s. However, 
something that caused the market to really open its eyes for underwriting agreements was in the 
summer of 2002 when Ericsson raised over SEK 30 Bn and paid total compensations of SEK 1.1 
Bn, of which a large part was a cost for the owners and banks to underwrite the issue. (Va.se, 
2009-03-26) When the financial crisis hit in 2008 companies use of underwriters became a 
common feature of almost all the rights issues on the Swedish market. Since then it has almost 
become a standard to secure that the rights issue becomes fully subscribed by using underwriters. 
At first there were only the major banks and institutions that secured rights issues for companies 
as underwriters. However, in the last couple of years there have been an increasing number of 
wealthy private investors who are now queuing to underwrite rights issues. As the use of 
underwriters has become a more or less matter of course for companies, private investors see the 
underwriting agreement as an increasingly profitable investment. Although private investors are 
getting more willing to underwrite rights issues, companies still tends to pay substantial amounts 
of compensation to the underwriters. (Affärsvärlden.se, 2012-06-19) 
 
- “The system of underwriting is often unnecessarily expensive for companies, as abuse occurs 
the need for it should always be questioned.” Günther Mårder CEO Aktiespararna 2010. 
 
In light of this, the study aims to investigate if the compensations paid to the underwriters are 
correctly priced given the risk reduction it gives for the company and its shareholders. By doing 
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this, the authors hope that they can see if there is excess return pricing and if there is a difference 
between Sweden and other countries regarding this matter.  
 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Rights Issues 
 
A rights issue is when a company is in need of funds and trying to raise money by offering new 
shares to the existing shareholders (Brealey et al, 2011). The most common way to issue new 
shares in Sweden is by preferential rights issues. This is due to the fact that the companies-act in 
Sweden states that, upon issuance of new shares, the existing shareholders have preferential 
rights to the new shares in proportion to the number of shares they already own. (ABL 2005:551 
Ch. 13) Furthermore, a rights issue can be done either in a defensive or in an offensive way. A 
defensive rights issue is when the money from the issue mainly goes to paying back debt or 
keeping the company afloat, while an offensive rights issue is one that companies do when they 
need new money for investments or in order to be able to make the next stage in a development 
process (Privataaffärer.se, 2010).  
 
1.1.2 Subscription Commitment and Underwritten Agreement 
 
When a company makes a rights issue, they can make use of subscription commitments and 
underwritten agreements in order to make sure that the company raise all the money they need. A 
subscription commitment means that an existing shareholder signs a contract with the company 
to buy all or some of their subscription rights. If the company want to ensure that the rights issue 
get fully subscribed, they can do this by using underwritten agreements. However, unlike 
subscription commitments, underwritten agreements are something that the issuing company 
usually must pay for, i.e. the company needs to pay a compensation fee to the underwriter for the 
risk the underwriter is taking. (Ogden, Jen, O'Connor, 2003) Issuing new shares is often 
associated with high transaction costs. As the management of a company is expected to be 
economically rational, especially when doing a rights issue, they should be keen on minimizing 
the costs. The compensation to the underwriter should therefore be in reasonable size in relation 
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to the risk reduction it gives for the company and the risk the underwriter is taking. (Marsh, 
1980) 
 
1.1.3 What Does the Market Look like Today 
 
In 2013, there were a record number of new rights issues made by Swedish companies. As rights 
issues are associated with risk for companies, this is a sign that risk appetite is back on the 
Swedish stock markets. An increased appetite for risk together with the strong performance in 
the Swedish stock markets have made it attractive for companies to issue new shares in order to 
raise funds (TT.se, 2014-01-09). According to Nyemissioner.se, there were as much as 82 rights 
issues made in the last quarter in 2013. At AktieTorget, where many small cap companies are 
listed, there was an increase in the shares issued by almost 20 percent1 throughout 2013 
compared to the year before (DN.se, 2014-01-09).  The total numbers of rights issues have 
increased as well as the total amount that is raised since the economic crisis in 2008. Since 2008 
it has almost become a standard to secure the rights issue by using underwriters. This remains 
until today even though the economic climate has stabilized. In almost all rights issues there is at 
least one underwriter, but often there are several people, institutions, banks etc. that share the 
underwriting obligation and by that diversifying the risk. (Nyemissioner.se)  
 
In a historical perspective, the compensations to the underwriters still lie on the same levels. 
What has changed in recent years is that the companies are setting a significantly larger discount 
to the actual share price of the new issue. This has become a common practice on the Swedish 
market after the Swedish airline company SAS made a rights issue in 2010 where the 
subscription price was set at 67 cents, a fraction of the then actual market price of the share. The 
consequence of this is that the dilution of the stocks is getting greater for shareholders. For 
underwriters, this reduces the risk that they have to buy any of the stocks they had underwritten. 
In the worst case scenario, the companies are selling shares to the underwriters at a really 
discounted price and at the same time pay them a compensation for it. As a consequence of the 
increasingly favorable conditions, to take the role as an underwriter has now become very 
popular for both institutions and private investors (Affärsvärlden.se, 2012-06-19).   
                                                 
1 Measured by SEK 
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As the risk is getting smaller and the conditions are getting better for the underwriters, more 
private investors are now queuing to take the role as an underwriter. When more investors open 
their eyes for underwriting agreements and the market becomes more mature the price should 
tend to get more effectively priced (Fama, 1970).  
 
1.2 Problem 
 
There are many reasons for companies to make use of underwriters when making a rights issue. 
However, managers must be careful that the company does not pay too much or for something 
they do not need. What is questionable is the value an underwritten agreement really provides for 
the company. The value of the underwritten agreement is the safety to be sure to sell all or most 
parts of the newly issued shares as well as the risk transfer this entails (Handley, 1995). What are 
also important to incorporate in the value are the signals it sends to the shareholders. For 
example, there is evidence that underwritten agreements signals to the shareholders that the stock 
is not overvalued (Ursel N.D., 2006; Cooney et al, 2003). This is good in the sense that it reduces 
the speculation that the shares are overvalued, which is often considered as the reason for new 
rights issues in line with the pecking order theory (Armitage, 2002; Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
 
Raising money from rights issues are not value creating in itself. If shareholders choose to 
subscribe for the rights issue, it is their own money that increases the company’s cash balance 
and thereby creating no extra value for the shareholders. Extra shareholder value can only be 
created if the money is invested in value creating projects. (Brealey et al, 2011) In that sense, 
lower transaction cost when making a rights issue gives the company more money to invest in 
value creating projects. Intuitively it must lie in the interest of the management to minimize the 
cost associated with the rights issue. However, there is a conflict of interest regarding 
underwriting agreements as it is only the large shareholders, private investors and institutions 
who receive compensation from the company to underwrite issues (Handley, 1995). All but the 
smaller shareholders benefit from this system. If an issuing company are making a rights issue to 
reduce its debt, then the banks that have lent money to the issuing companies obviously are very 
keen that the issue are underwritten as it ensures that the companies are receiving the money to 
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reduce its debt burden. Managers are also ready to do a lot of sacrifices to ensure that a rights 
issue gets fully subscribed, like setting the subscription price at a high discount for instance, as a 
not fully subscribed rights issue is seen as a failure (Cooney et al, 2003; Kunimura & Iihara, 
1985). This means that it is only the smaller shareholders who can criticize the choice of using 
underwriters and the compensations the company pays for it. In the end it is also the smaller 
shareholders who are paying the price for the unused and expensive underwriter agreements. 
(VA.se, 2009-03-26)  
 
Previous studies on the compensations companies pay for underwritten agreements have been 
made in other international markets. There are evidence for overpriced underwritten agreements 
in many of these studies, for instance Marsh (1980) found that in both the US and the UK market 
the compensation was overpriced with as much as 98 percent of the compensation fee in the US 
market, as well as Handley (1995) who found the same general result in the Australian where the 
compensation was overpriced with approximately 49 percent of the compensation fee. 
Furthermore, there have also been studies on the Japanese market where Kunimura and Iihara 
(1985) find that there was a significant excess return in the market. In contrast Bae and Levy 
(1990) found that there was a competitive pricing in their sample of 679 rights issues on the US 
market. Handley (1995) as well as Cooney et al (2003) study what might drive this mispricing by 
using regression analysis for different variables, for instance variables like: debt-burden, 
subscription discount and volatility, where they find different significant variables in each of 
their studies. Although there are some studies conducted on different markets there are none for 
the Swedish market. This is possibly because the use of underwriting agreements is a relatively 
young and new phenomenon on the Swedish market (FI, 2007). As there are no previous studies 
conducted on the Swedish market there is a research gap that needs to be filled. The authors 
therefore see this as an interesting market to investigate. Further, the authors also want to see 
whether the underwriting agreements are more effectively priced now, due to maturity and 
market forces, than what can be seen in previous studies. 
 
  
  12 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
1. Are the compensations the companies pays to the underwriters fair in relation to the risk 
reduction it gives to the company and its shareholders on the Swedish market?  
 
2. Are underwriting agreements more effectively priced in Sweden than on other markets 
examined in previous research? 
 
1.4 Purpose 
 
The purpose of the study is to see if Swedish companies, when making rights issues, are paying 
fair compensations to underwriters in relation to what they gain in risk protection.  By doing this 
the authors are also going see whether the compensations are more effectively priced relative to 
what previous studies have shown in other markets. The goal of the study is to provide a basis 
for companies when deciding the compensation to the underwriters.  
 
1.5 Delimitations 
 
The authors limit the study by looking at companies listed on the Swedish market. This is 
interesting as there are differences in the laws regarding underwritten agreements for different 
countries. Sweden has a unique law, which is stated earlier, that states that the existing 
shareholders have priority when there are new shares issued (ABL 2005:551 Ch. 13). The use of 
underwriters is also a relatively new phenomenon on the Swedish market, which makes a study 
of this market needed. The authors choose to analyze companies that have undergone one or 
more rights issues with an underwriter during the period 2008-2013. Why this time-period is 
chosen is because of the fact that it represents one whole business-cycle (Businesscycle.com, 
2013). There have been no previous studies conducted on the Swedish market before, why a 
more up to date data set is used. The data is collected from the stock exchanges Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm, NGM Equity and AktieTorget. All the rights issues on these exchanges have been 
collected but later revised to arrive at the final sample. This makes the sample diverse and it is 
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going to be possible to see if there are any differences between firms on different exchanges. In 
order to be able to calculate an option price, the authors only make use of rights issues that are 
paid in cash. That means that certain rights issues that have options, units or other different 
attachments are not to be included. The authors also exclude IPO’s, since historical share prices 
are needed for the calculations.  Further, the authors use the theories discussed and take the 
variables that is used in the option valuation into consideration when analyzing the sample and 
do not look into further variables. 
 
1.6 Study Outline 
 
In chapter two the relevant theories for the study and a literature review is presented. Chapter 
three explains and describes the choice of method and the framework used as well as discussions 
about the validity and reliability of the study, while chapter four presents the empirical evidence 
collected in a structured and intuitive way. In Chapter five, an analysis is made of the empirical 
data using the theories discussed earlier. The study ends in chapter six where the author’s 
presents a discussion by answering the research questions and give suggestions for further 
research. 
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2. Theory 
 
This chapter goes through the relevant theories that later are the basis for the study’s analysis 
chapter. A literature review of earlier empirical research in the area of underwritten rights 
issues and adjacent subjects are also presented. 
 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis, or EMH as first presented by Eugene Fama in 1970 and later 
revisited in 1991, is a measure that in its strongest version is said to reflect all available 
information on the market in the prices of securities. It is also said that EHM is needed in order 
to make resource allocation signals accurate (Fama, 1970). According to the literature, this is not 
the only market efficiency. The different market efficiencies are weak-, semi-strong- and strong-
market efficiency and below there is a review of each one of them (Fama, 1991).  
 
2.1.1 Weak Market 
 
The first market efficiency is the weak form which is characterized as a market where the only 
information that one can observe is the historical prices from different securities (Fama, 1991). 
When using this model you tend to get random walks (Ross, 1977). The random walk theory 
states that historical directions or movements of the price in a stock cannot be used to predict 
future movements (Fama, 1995).  
 
2.1.2 Semi-Strong Market 
 
There is semi-strong efficiency in a market if it is reflected by the historical prices of securities, 
just as in the weak market, but also by all the available public information on the market (Fama, 
1970). Information such as press releases or regular news could constitute as public information. 
However, there is no way to gain from this information as all available information already is 
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incorporated in the price of the securities. Thus there are no arbitrage opportunities in a semi-
strong efficient market. (Fama, 1970) 
 
2.1.3 Strong Market 
 
Strong market efficiency is characterized by the fact that no information, even if it is insider 
information, can make any value change in a security since all information already is 
incorporated in the price of the security. There is no real market where this is actually true and 
thus insiders can still gain significantly from trading. (Fama, 1970) 
 
2.1.4 The Swedish Market 
 
There are not many earlier studies about which efficiency that are prevailing on the Swedish 
market except for Claesson (1987) who found that the Swedish market is a semi-strong market. 
However, there have been some recent studies where tests have been conducted to see whether 
the Swedish market follows a random walk or not. If there is random walk in a market, it is 
evidence that the market shows signs of weak form efficiency (Fama, 1970).  These studies 
found no concluding evidence that the market follows a random walk, meaning that the semi-
strong market that Claesson argued for in 1987 seems to still hold (Shaker, 2013). Therefore, this 
study sees the Swedish market as a semi-strong market. This means that all available information 
that is at hand is incorporated in the price of a security and thus the compensation that companies 
pays to the underwriter should be effectively priced, otherwise the market is not efficient 
according to the theory. 
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2.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 
The pecking order theory is a theory about the optimal capital structure in a company and how 
that optimal structure should be accomplished and managed. The theory states that a company 
should, when it is possible, always raise money for an investment by using internally generated 
money first, i.e. use the current cash-flow surplus available as internally generated money is the 
cheapest form of financing. There should be a clear dividend policy and this policy should be 
sticky, which means that it should not be easily altered (Brealey et al, 2011). The second 
financing choice should be by issuing debt or some hybrid of debt. The last resort of financing, 
according to the pecking order theory, is equity by making a rights issue (Koller et al, 2010). 
 
One of the reasons why this theory is so accepted and recognized is because of the signaling 
effect the choice of funding has for the investors. For example, equity is seen as a last resort as it 
sends a weak signal for the future of the company and an indication that the share price could be 
overvalued (Koller et al, 2010). Furthermore, as all the rights issues are made in either a 
defensive or an offensive way there should be a difference in the price if the pecking order 
theory were to hold. A defensive rights issue, i.e. a rights issue where the funds are used in order 
to pay back debt, should be more expensive for the company as it is associated with more risk 
and thus the compensation to underwriters should intuitively be higher. 
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2.3 Signaling Theory 
 
The most forward way to think about the signaling theory is that there are two parties, one who is 
the sender and one who is the receiver of the message. The sender must make clear and know 
how to signal and communicate the information that the receiver gets. While the receiver, who 
get the information, must decide how the information is going to be interpreted. (Connelly et al, 
2011) It is this theory that explains why companies, who use rights issues in order to raise 
capital, need to use underwriters. The use of underwriters assures the quality of the rights issue 
and becomes, according to Marsh (1980) as well as Slovin, Sushka and Lai (2000), a safety net 
for the investors. 
 
The concept that is central for the signaling theory is the information asymmetry concept. This 
concept constitutes that there is asymmetry between the sender and receiver in the information 
they have, which is particularly important when the information is about the quality or the intent 
of a decision (Connelly et al, 2011). In a situation where the sender has more information than 
the receiver, there is a will for the sender to signal his intent and quality of the decision because 
of this information asymmetry. For instance when a company is deciding to make a rights issue, 
some receivers consider the share price as overvalued which make the share value drop (Brealey 
et al, 2011). This is the type of signaling effects that Armitage (2002) discusses in his study, in 
which he also see a positive signal effect when the rights issue has a large discount. What the 
signaling theory could be used for in this study is to further describe why there is a difference 
between an offensive and a defensive rights issue as an offensive rights issue should send a more 
positive signal to the market. 
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2.4 Previous Empirical Research 
 
Table 1 empirical research 
Author Year Period Market Method Sample 
(n) 
Estimated excess return (as % of 
compensation fee in brackets) 
Marsh 1980 1962-
1975 
UK Black and Scholes 174 1,21 % (63%) 
Marsh 1980 1969-
1973 
USA 
(utility) 
Black and Scholes 47 1,08 % (98,7 %) 
Kunimura 
and Iihara 
1985 1970-
1980 
Japan Black and Scholes 148 1,89 % (76%) 
Bae and 
Levy 
1990 1982-
1985 
USA Black and Scholes 679 0,13%(n.a) 
Breedon and 
Twinn 
1995 1986-
1994 
UK Black and Scholes 31 1,14% (91%) 
Handley 1995 1991-
1993 
Australia Black and Scholes 60 0,6% (49 %) 
Cooney et al 2003 1974-
1991 
Japan Event study/Black 
and Scholes 
555 Put-value for rights issues are 
positively correlated with 
announcement return 
Armitage 2002 1985-
1996 
UK Correlation to test 
the Eckbo-Masulis 
Theory 
1378 No support for EM theory, 
meaning that the company does not 
benefit from underwriters as a 
certifier of value. 
 
 
2.4.1 Option Valuations for Rights Issue Compensations 
 
As Marsh (1980) was one of the first to use options theory in order to see if underwriting 
compensations are correctly priced, he paved the way for many of the studies that came after his. 
In his study he is using the Black and Scholes model in order to value underwriting agreements 
during the period 1962-1975 in the UK. He uses 174 companies in his sample as there was 
problem finding the volatility for all companies that issued new shares. The volatility that is 
being used by Marsh (1980) is the volatility of the stock four years prior the issue. The volatility 
measure is what stands out between Marsh’s (1980) study and most of the studies that came after 
his, where the later studies have used much shorter volatility windows. For instance Handley 
(1995) used 180 trading days prior the rights issue, Bae and Levy (1990) as well as Cooney et al 
(2003) used 90 days prior the rights issue. Marsh’s study concludes that the excess return was on 
average 63 percent of the compensation fee for the underwriting agreements in the UK for the 
underwriters and sub underwriters. He found this excess return by deducting the value from the 
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option valuation model from the actual underwriting compensation fee paid out. He further found 
that the variables that increased the excess return the most are when the agreements are short-
lived and where there is a low volatility in the stock (Marsh, 1980). He also see that there might 
be some side payments and other factors, like administrative costs if an issue were to fail, that 
can affect the excess compensation which is in line with what Armitage (2002) discuss when he 
talks about sub-underwriters and the reputation underwriters must uphold. Marsh also 
investigates the US market, where there was an excess return to the underwriters of as much as 
98,7 percent of the compensation fee. In the US data he uses only rights issues with regular 
underwriting agreements2 and has only a relatively small sample of 47 rights issues, a sample 
size that can be questionable in relation to the size of this market. Further, the authors see the 
volatility of four years in Marsh (1980) study as a bit too long period since the companies 
investigated can change a lot during four years and thereby the volatility as well. Although the 
companies were not changing as much in 1980 as today this is probably the biggest drawback to 
raise in the study from Marsh (1980). 
 
Kunimura and Iihara made a study in 1985 on the Japanese market where they found that on 
average the excess return was 1,89 percentage points or put differently 76 percent of the 
compensation fee. 1,89 percentage points is a number that is higher than both Marsh (1980) for 
the UK market and Handley (1995) for the Australian market. Their study has a sample size of 
148 issues and they also make use of the Black and Scholes model as Marsh (1980), Handley 
(1995), Bae & Levy (1990) and Breedon & Twinn (1995). The variable used for the model that 
stands out is volatility where they have used the same as Marsh (1980), i.e. 4 years prior the 
issue. The same criticism can be applied here as the authors have for Marsh’s choice of a 
volatility window of 4 years. 
 
Breedon and Twinn conducted a study, similar to Marsh (1980), on the UK market in 1995. 
However, their sample was much smaller compared to the sample size in Marsh (1980) with only 
31 rights issues. They did get almost the exact same excess return as Marsh (1980), but the 
question is if this result really can be generalized over the whole market with such few 
observations. 
                                                 
2 In the US study, Marsh ignored the rights issues that made use of sub-underwriters 
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Handley (1995) conducted a study on the Australian market where he also used the Black and 
Scholes formula to see the pricing and risk of underwriting agreements. The study is conducted 
on 60 rights issues with a time frame of 3 years. The main difference between Marsh (1980) and 
Handley (1995) is the volatility, where Handley used a much shorter volatility window. The 
main result from the study is in line with Marsh (1980) and Breedon & Twinn (1995), Handley 
find that on average 49 percent of the underwriting compensation is excess return or put another 
way the difference between the put-value and the underwriting compensation paid is 0.6 
percentage points. The excess returns to the underwriters are shown to be unrelated to the size of 
the issue and the condition of the market at the time of the issue. However, there is a 
significantly higher excess return when looking at the issues where there is a low volatility and 
where there is a large discount, i.e. much lower subscription price than share price (Handley, 
1995), this result is related to Armitage (2002) findings concerning discounts and announcement 
effects where a higher discount gives a negative announcement effect. Handley have a thorough 
approach to the options valuation although he have a short investigated period of years of which 
he does not state anything about the reasons for. The authors are also questioning the usage of 
the share-price chosen as there are no dilution effect calculated, an effect that is always present 
in all rights issues made and that should be taken into consideration to obtain a reliable result. 
 
Bae and Levy (1990) was also using the Black and Scholes model to see whether the pricing of 
rights issues and the risk that is related to was effectively priced. They used 679 seasoned equity 
offers from listed firms in the US during the period 1982-1985. What they found was that the 
pricing was competitive with a significant excess return of 0.13 percent of the compensation to 
the underwriters. This low excess return is in contrast with both Handley (1995), Breedon and 
Twinn (1995) and Marsh (1980), although the studies might not be directly comparable due to 
differences in the markets laws and commitments it still gives a good valuation for the risk that is 
related to underwriting agreements. Although Bae and Levy (1990) do not motivate how they 
calculate excess return and what values they actually use in a proper way, they have without a 
doubt the biggest sample for calculating the excess return with the Black and Scholes model.  
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2.4.2 Rights Issues and Signaling 
 
The study made by Cooney et al (2003) is a study on the Japanese market. The time dimension 
plays a big role on the Japanese market as the subscription price is set several days before the 
subscription period starts, whereas in the US and most other markets it is set much closer to the 
announcement day with the use of the fixed-price offering method. Furthermore, the high 
discount used on the Japanese market, where subscription price is set well below the share price, 
distinguishes the Japanese market. The study makes use of an event study as well as the option 
valuation method as in many other studies that study underwritten agreements. Cooney et al 
(2003) concludes that the higher the offer price is, or the lower the discount is, the higher the put 
value is and hence the bigger risk there is for the underwriter. Because of this, the study 
concludes that the put-value is positively correlated with the announcement effect (Cooney et al, 
2003). Further the study conclude that the fixed-price offering method is mostly used by 
companies who have a high volatility and therefore high uncertainty about the value in the 
preannouncement period, which is in line with what Handley (1995) suggests. Cooney et al 
(2003) see the value between the put-option and the real compensations paid as the risk the 
company have in the underwriting agreements where a higher put-value means lower risk for the 
company. Their result on the Japanese market is then set in comparison to the US market. 
However, as the US market might be completely different from the Japanese market, regarding 
rights issues and the laws surrounding them, another more comparable country might have been 
more applicable to use.  
 
Armitages’ (2002) study is related to the overall subject of rights issues and underwriters but it 
does not use any form of options theory as the previous studies have made. It does however shed 
some light on the signaling effects that underwriters might send. Armitage have based his study 
on the theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) that says that when a company makes a rights issue it 
is predicted that this have a negative effect on the share price as the investors see the share as 
overvalued. Armitages’ (2002) has also based his study on the theory by Slovin, Sushka and Lai 
(2000) that says the major benefit of an underwriter is that it certifies the issuers quality and 
value of the share. He uses data from rights issues and open offers in the UK to test these two 
theories and see if they show any abnormal return around the announcements. Armitage finds 
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that underwritten open offers3 have a positive abnormal return of 2.9 percent whereas 
underwritten rights issues have a negative abnormal return of 2.6 percent around announcement. 
The discount however is not a substitute for having an underwriter, it is rather a indication of 
how well the company is doing at the time of the rights issue. For example, a bigger discount 
shows indications that it is a company that need funding in order to survive, i.e. a defensive 
rights issue, which is in line with Myers and Majluf (1984). Armitage further concludes that the 
main purpose of underwriting in the UK is to guarantee the amount that is being underwritten 
rather than to certify that the issuer is not overvalued. The study does not really make clear how 
the sample is gathered or where it can be found. This is something that makes the validity of the 
study a bit weak. Furthermore, there is not a distinction between markets or if the companies are 
in the face of growth or if they are mature which can have a big influence when looking for 
signals.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
3 Open offer means that the shares you purchase during the issuance cannot be sold to other parties. 
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3. Method 
 
The chapter begins with how the authors choose and found the relevant data. This is later 
followed by the method used when handling the data. The chapter finishes with some source 
criticism and a discussion about the validity and reliability of the study. 
 
3.1 Research Approach and Data 
 
This study uses a deductive approach as explained by Bryman and Bell (2011). However, the 
authors do not use a deductive approach in its clearest form as the authors do not produce any 
hypothesis. The research questions asked are from previous research and the authors are 
therefore going to test if this holds for the Swedish market with the use of the Black and Scholes 
option theory. After looking at previous research, the authors understood that there is a research 
gap on the Swedish market and considerable savings for companies to be gained.  
 
3.1.1 Data 
 
The data that is used in this study are surrounding the companies that have undergone one or 
more rights issues with an underwriter during the period 2008-20134. Why this is an adequate 
time-period is because of the fact that it represents a whole business-cycle (Businesscycle.com, 
2013). Further there are no studies on the Swedish market on this subject and therefore it is 
adequate to take the last known years in order to get the data up to date. The data is collected 
from the stock exchanges Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, NGM Equity and AktieTorget. These 
different exchanges were chosen due to the fact that they have different companies, regarding 
size and maturity, listed on them. Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and NGM Equity are two 
representative exchanges due to the fact that they are two of the biggest, regulated exchanges in 
Sweden (FI.se). As a complement to these regulated exchanges, the authors have chosen to 
include AktieTorget since there are many growth companies listed on this exchange. This gives 
                                                 
4 The complete set of companies can be found in appendix 1 
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the authors a more diverse sample and one more segment to investigate, which makes the 
validity of the study stronger (Bryman & Bell ,2011). 
 
From the chosen exchanges there is a large amount of raw data to be found at the main sources 
Nyemissioner.se and FI.se. When searching through the companies, all in all 5305, the relevant 
prospects for the chosen companies are downloaded and further investigated. From the 530 
companies, there are 86 potential companies that match the requested criteria’s. The 444 
companies that do not match the criteria’s are either rights issues not paid in cash or they make 
use of contract units in the issue. Out of the 86 companies, the authors tried to find all the 
relevant variables through different sources and articles. Although the authors tried with different 
sources and data, one or more of the relevant variables that is needed for the calculations could 
not be found in 21 of the initial population. The number of companies actually used is therefore 
65. This is an adequate sample size compared to the initial population, as the sample of 65 
companies is well representative of the exchanges investigated. The sample is well diversified 
between the exchanges, where most of the data represent the two of the biggest exchanges, 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and AktieTorget, and smaller share of data represent NGM Equity. The 
sample size and representativeness is approximately the same as other studies on the same 
subject, although these studies have bigger economic markets (Handley, 1995; Marsh, 1980; 
Breedon & Twinn, 1995). The data that the authors are using from the prospects are: subscription 
price, issued amount, guaranteed amount, guarantee compensation, record date, underwriting 
date, dilution effect6 and days of subscription period. The companies are divided by which stock 
exchange they were listed on when the rights issue was made7. The data is then sorted by year 
and if it is an offensive or defensive issue. 
 
The share price for each company, which is set to the day before the underwritten agreement was 
signed, is collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. Why the day before underwritten agreement is 
used is due to the fact that after the announcement of a rights issue the share price can either go 
up or down in line with the signaling theory depending on how the market reacts to the news. 
                                                 
5 Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 141 observations, AktieTorget 353 observations, NGM Equity 36 observations. 
6 Met by number of new shares divided by old ones. 
7 Some companies have changed exchange or gotten delisted. 
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Due to the fact that shareholders have the option to buy new shares at a lower price than the 
actual share price, rights issues have a dilution effect on the share price. In respect to the dilution 
effect, the authors choose to adjust the collected share price by the new number of shares to 
arrive at an adjusted share price after the offering8. This is in line with earlier research in this 
area (Marsh, 1980; Handley, 1995). 
 
The implicit volatility could also be found on Thomson Reuters Eikon for almost all the 
companies. The time-period is set to 90 days before the record date and the number used is the 
average during this time-period. 90 days is used in order to avoid possible peaks that can skew 
the numbers when using a smaller time window. Around 90 days have been used in many of the 
earlier studies on this subject (Cooney et al, 2003; Breedon & Twinn, 1995) and in Bae and Levy 
(1990) exactly 90 days was used. For the companies that the authors could not find any volatility, 
the volatility is calculated by taking the annualized standard deviation from the share prices 
during a 90 day period prior the underwriting day. The authors are also collecting and calculating 
the 30 day volatility in order to make a robustness check and see how much affect the volatility 
have on the result. This is done in order to find if the variable, when altered, give a different 
result and to strengthen the structural validity (Lu & White, 2013). 
 
The last variable, that is needed to be able to make use of the B&S option pricing model, is the 
risk-free rate. This is collected from Investing.com by using the average 3 month Swedish 
government bond during the different companies’ subscription period (Investing.com, 2014). 
The risk-free rate needs to be an average due to the fact that the risk-free rate must be constant 
when applying the B&S option pricing model (Black & Scholes, 1972). 
 
3.1.2 Data Division 
 
The data used is divided into different clusters to see whether there are any differences between 
their specifications. The first cluster the authors look at is whether there were any differences in 
which exchange the company was listed on when making the rights issue. The authors divide 
                                                 
8 Adjusted share price after the offering = ((share price*old shares)+size of the issue)/(old shares+new shares)  
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them between Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, NGM Equity and AktieTorget. This is done in order to 
see if there might be any correlation between the compensations paid and what exchange the 
rights issue is made on. Further the previous studies like Marsh (1980), Handley (1995) and 
Breedon and Twinn (1995) have not divided their sample into different exchanges, why the 
authors think that this can add weight to the study. The data is also divided into defensive and 
offensive rights issues to see if there is a significant difference between these two types of issues. 
A division between defensive and offensive are further interesting because of the signaling effect 
a defensive rights issue can have.  
 
3.2 Methods Used when Handling the Data 
3.2.1 Value the Underwriting Agreement using Options Pricing Model 
 
The value of using an underwriter for a company can be quantified by using an option valuation. 
By doing this, one can see how much a company should, in an efficient market, pay for the 
option of having an underwriter (Marsh, 1980). It is possible to use an option theory for this 
because of the nature of an underwriting agreement, where the company has the option to sell 
and the underwriter commits to buy the shares that are left unsubscribed. By doing this the 
company take away some of the risk in the issue. However, for this risk reduction the company 
needs to compensate the underwriter with a compensation between 2-10 percent of the 
guaranteed amount9(Affärsvärlden.se, 2012-06-19). In that sense underwritten agreement can be 
seen as a put option. The underwriter is selling the obligation to buy the remaining shares and the 
issuing company is buying the right to sell the remaining shares (Marsh, 1980).  
 
Why this is useful is because the underwriting compensation fee that the company needs to pay, 
should, if there is an efficient market, be equal to the value of the calculated put-option. The 
options theory used is the classic Black and Scholes (B&S) options pricing theory. There are of 
course other options models to use, like the Binomial options pricing model first introduced in 
1979 by Cox et al, but as these two models are very similar when it comes to valuing European 
                                                 
9 On the Swedish market 
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call and put options (Broadie & Detemple, 2004), the authors chose Black and Scholes option 
valuation as it is the most recognized and used model by other researchers in this field. 
  
3.2.2 Black and Scholes Options Theory 
 
When a rights issue is made with an underwriting agreement, the underwriter is bound to buy the 
stocks that are not sold. Due to the fact that the company buys this agreement and the 
underwriter has the obligation to deliver, one can therefore see this agreement as a put option 
(Marsh, 1980; Handley, 1995). The company buys the right to sell and the underwriter is bound 
to buy and for this the underwriter is paid a compensation. It is this compensation that is seen as 
the put option price in this study. In order for the agreement to be priced correctly, the actual 
paid compensation should be equal the put option value that is calculated by using B&S option 
pricing model (Marsh, 1980). The price of a call has the formula:  
 
Equation 1: C = S x N(d1)10 - K x e-rt x N(d2)11 
Where the variables interpretation is: 
 
Table 2 Black and Scholes variables 
Original B&S variables Variables interpreted for this study 
C: Call price. C: Call Price. 
S: The current share price S: Adjusted share price the day before the underwritten 
agreement was signed. 
N(d1 & d2): Cumulative normal distribution functions N(d1 & d2): Cumulative normal distribution functions 
K: Exercise price K: Subscription price 
r: Risk-free rate  r: Average risk-free rate calculated by the 3 month 
Swedish government bond during the different 
companies’ subscription period 
 
The price of the call option can then be used to find the value of a put option, which is what the 
authors are looking for, by using the put-call parity. Put-call parity states that a European put 
option with a non-dividend paying stock should be equal to: 
 
Equation 2: P = C - S + K x e-rt 
                                                 
10 d1=log[S/K]+(r+0,5σ^²)*T/σ√T 
11 d2=d1-σ√T 
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This means that you short the underlying stock and buy risk-free zero coupon bonds on top of the 
call-option price (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007; Marsh, 1980). Later, it is this put-option price that is 
compared to the real compensation paid by the companies. It is possible to use this formula since 
the rights issue can be seen as a non-dividend paying stock (Marsh, 1980). Furthermore, out of 
the five variables that are needed in order to use the B&S model, four variables are directly 
observable in the raw-data. This is good for the validity of the numbers that is derived for the 
model. The observable variables are the stock price S, the time to maturity T12, the exercise price 
K and the risk-free rate r. The only variable that cannot be observed is the volatility σ for the 
shares. The procedure for finding and calculating the volatility can be found in the Data section.   
 
When B&S derived their model they start from the premise that the current share price S follows 
a geometric Brownian motion and they make some assumptions about the market and stock 
price: (1) The capital markets are perfect, which means that there are no transaction costs or 
taxes and the information available is available for all participants. (2) The volatility of return of 
the stock is constant during the options duration. (3) Interest rate in the short term is fixed and 
the same for both borrowers and lenders. (4) Option holder is protected against distributions that 
affect the stock-price. (5) The returns on the stock are lognormal distributed. (6) The stock pays 
no dividends and (7) the option is European and can only be exercised at maturity. (Black & 
Scholes, 1972. Marsh, 1980) 
 
When calculating rights issues and the underwriting compensations, all of these assumptions 
might not be entirely met. However, Marsh (1980) and Handley (1995) argues that they for the 
most part seem to be good approximations. The option in this study, i.e. the value of the 
underwriting agreement, can be seen as a European put option. This option has a short duration 
and therefore most surely have about the same risk-free rate during the option period. The start 
of the option is the day of the underwriting agreement and the end of the subscription period is 
the end of the option. There are no dividends paid during the options period, if there were 
dividends during the period these would be easily observable in the prospects of the rights issues 
                                                 
12 Time to maturity, i.e. the duration of the option, is the time from the signing of the underwriting agreement to the 
last day of the subscription period.   
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and thus possible to take into account (Marsh, 1980).  
 
3.2.3 Significance Test 
 
In order to be able to test if the results from the comparison between a defensive and an offensive 
rights issue and the differences between the calculated and real compensation fees are 
statistically significant there is a need for significance tests. In the literature there are many 
different test statistics that can be applied to studies, although the one most researchers in the 
area of underwriting valuation use is the t-statistics or student’s t-test, see for example Cooney et 
al (2003) and Handley (1995). The t-test is used in order to see if two sets of data are 
significantly different from each other. If they are, there is significance to the difference and 
there are possibilities to draw conclusions out of the sample. Further in order to see if the prices 
between the real compensations paid and the option prices are significantly different a Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test is used, which is also conducted by Handley (1995). 
  
3.3 Source Criticism 
 
This study primarily uses secondary data as the majority of the data is collected from the 
prospects for every rights issue. Despite this, they can be considered as reliable sources since the 
prospects either have the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority’s (FI) or a certified 
accountant approval. When collecting data for share prices, the authors are using Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. For finding the risk-free rate, the authors are using Investing.com. Thomson 
Reuters Eikon is a reliable and well known source but one should always be careful when using 
internet-sources like Investing.com. However, Investing.com is a leading global financial portal 
site that have been around since 2007 and after going through the page and what has been written 
about it, the authors feel sure that it is a valid source that provides correct quotes and technical 
data. Furthermore, the books, papers or internet pages that are used for the theory are all reliable 
and well cited. The other internet sources that are being used, like for instance newspapers, can 
of course have an agenda or a twist on the information given. However, this is something that the 
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authors have in mind when they acquire the information. That is why the authors also try to have 
different sources for the same theories or information. 
 
3.4 Reliability 
 
Reliability is said to be the extent to which the data collection techniques or analysis yield 
consistent findings independent of who performs it (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
From the method chapter above there is a clear and complete review of how the proceeding is 
being conducted. Furthermore, since the data used, except for the volatility, is directly 
observable the numbers should yield the same results. The volatility could give different values 
depending on how you calculate it but the difference should be small and negligible. 
 
When there is calculations needed the authors make use of the special formulas that can be found 
in Excel or SPSS and checked if the other formulas used, like Black and Scholes, is consistent 
with the formulas in Marsh (1980) and the other literature used. For the search of data regarding 
share-prices and volatilities, the platform used is Thomson Reuters Eikon which is a platform 
that is not easily available but possible to get a license to. The raw-data that are used i.e. 
subscription price, guaranteed amount etc. is collected from the prospects that can be found at 
Nyemissioner.se by searching for the relevant company. 
 
Furthermore there might be some possible errors in the study. This is due to the fact that all data 
that is collected from the prospects are manually processed, i.e. the numbers have been manually 
transferred from the prospects onto the excel sheet used. The data are checked several times, so 
possible errors should be negligible.  
 
3.5 Validity  
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011) there are several validity categories to take into 
consideration. The ones used in this chapter are: measurement validity, internal validity and 
external validity. 
  31 
 
 
Measurement validity is about whether the study measures what it should measure (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011). Because of the fact that this study’s purpose is to look at the compensation for rights 
issues, the most relevant issue is how to measure what the compensation should be. The study 
uses the Black and Scholes Option pricing model from Black and Scholes (1970) in order to do 
this. The model is further used in previous studies similar to this but on different markets (Marsh, 
1980; Handley, 1995). 
 
Internal validity discusses the causality in the relationship between two variables, i.e. does the x-
variable (independent) and only the x-variable cause the effect on the y-variable (dependent) or 
are there any other variables that cause the effect (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Since this study sees 
the Swedish market as a semi-strong market, the security reflects all available public information 
and therefore the results are valid.  
 
The external validity is about the representativeness of the sample and if there is a generalizable 
result from the sample (Bryman & Bell, 2011). This is discussed and examined earlier in this 
chapter, where the authors choose exchanges that is representable for the Swedish market, where 
there are both small and big companies in different stages and with different maturities.   
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4. Empirical Evidence 
 
In this chapter the study’s empirical evidence is presented. First the result for the whole sample 
is presented to see the more general numbers. The result is then divided and presented in smaller 
clusters to further enlighten the problem. 
 
4.1 Option Valuation Results 
 
In table 3 there is a table of the different options variables and their average value, in order for 
the reader to better understand what type of values that have been used in the calculations of the 
option. 
 
Table 3 the average for relevant variables used when valuing the put-option 
 Variables for the option 
      
 65 Rights issues     
 Subscription price SEK Adjusted share price Risk-free rate Trading days Volatility 
Average 5.00 8.38 1.03% 33.40 109.84% 
Median 1.60 8.38 0.95% 32.00 91.97% 
Subscription price used is the price that can be seen in the different rights issues prospects. Trading days is the time from the day the 
underwriting agreement was signed until the last day of the subscription period. Volatility used is the 90 days average implied volatility for the 
different companies as the Black and Scholes model needs a constant volatility during the options duration. Risk-free rate, this variable is 
derived from the 3 month Swedish government bond during the different companies’ subscription period. Adjusted share price is a theoretical 
share price that takes account of the dilution effect.  
 
After the valuation had been carried out and the put-option price had been calculated the result 
showed that the guarantee compensations between 2008-2013 on the Swedish market are, on 
average, not effectively priced. The results from the calculations can be seen in table 4 overall 
results. 
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Table 4 Overall results from the Black and Scholes valuation 
 Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option 
price* (P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage of 
compensation fee** 
Average 6.98% 5.69% 1.28% 18.34% 
Median 7.01% 2.12% 2.90% 41.37% 
 
*percentage of guaranteed 
amount 
**percentage of guarantee 
compensation 
    
 
When looking at the actual paid compensations in table 4 the underwriter get on average a 
compensation of 6.98 percent for his commitment to underwrite a rights issue. However, when 
calculating this compensation, as if it were effectively priced by using the option valuation, the 
underwriter should in fact get 5.69 percent on average. This means that on average an 
underwriter get 18.3413 percent higher compensation, compared to the guaranteed amount, than 
what he would get if the exchange were effectively priced.  
 
The result varies over the sample where the biggest overpriced difference between the actual 
compensation and the calculated put-option price is as high as 17.92 percent. The biggest 
underpriced difference between the actual compensation and the calculated put-option price is 
19.68 percent. There is a total of 21(n: 65) underpriced rights issues in the sample which is 32.31 
percent, while the rest of the 44 issues were overpriced, i.e. 67.69 percent. 14 
 
When looking at this in real numbers the companies approximately paid SEK 5 Mn more in 
compensation on average than they would if the market were effectively priced. The rights issues 
guaranteed amount varied from SEK 1 Mn to SEK 17 634 Mn with an average guaranteed 
amount of SEK 572 Mn. There are a total of 33 offensive rights issues and 32 defensive rights 
issues.  
 
As in line with Handley (1995), the difference between the put-value numbers and the real 
compensations paid is tested for significance with a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank. This test gave a p-
value of 0.027, which can be seen in table 5, i.e. the sample is significant at the 5 percent level 
                                                 
13 Calculated by taking 1.28/6.98. 
14 The 10 companies with the highest compensations and the highest difference between real compensation and put-
values can be seen in appendix 2. 
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and the real compensation paid and the option price calculated is statistically different from each 
other. 
 
Table 5 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test 
Test Statisticsa 
 2 - 1 
Z -2.207b 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .027 
a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
b. Based on positive ranks. 
 
 
4.1.2 Robustness Check 
 
In line with Lu and Whites’ article from 2013, a robustness check is conducted to see if the 
volatilities used were providing a robust result. This test is conducted using 30 day volatility and 
retrieved almost the exact same values15 as the valuation with 90 days volatility. It is important 
to keep in mind that the average volatility for 30 days is higher due to the shorter time-span. 
Therefore, the answer is a bit higher with 30-day volatility but not enough to investigate this 
further or make any alterations to the data. 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 The difference between the two valuations’ were on average a couple of percentage points higher return for the 
30-day volatility when comparing the excess return as percentage of compensation fee. 
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4.2 Result Divided by Exchange 
 
In order to be able to further analyze the result, the data is divided into different smaller clusters. 
The data is divided both by which exchange the companies were listed on and if the rights issue 
is offensive or defensive.  
 
Table 6 result divided by exchange clusters 
  Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option 
price* (P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage of 
compensation fee** 
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm 
        
Average 5.35% 2.47% 2.88% 53.83% 
Median 5.00% 0.86% 4.14% 82.80% 
NGM Equity         
Average 7.41% 10.00% -2.60% -35.09% 
Median 7.74% 2.62% 5.12% 66.15% 
AktieTorget         
Average 9.14% 8.64% 0.50% 5.47% 
Median 9.99% 7.70% 2.29% 22.92% 
*percentage of guaranteed amount      
**percentage of guarantee compensation    
 
4.2.1 Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
 
Table 7 Nasdaq OMX Stockholm 
  Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option 
price* (P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage of 
compensation fee** 
Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm 
        
Average 5.35% 2.47% 2.88% 53.83% 
Median 5.00% 0.86% 4.14% 82.80% 
*percentage of guaranteed amount    
**percentage of guarantee compensation    
 
For the companies that are listed on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm during the period 2008-2013 
there are on average an overvaluation of the compensations companies paid to underwriters. The 
average difference between the actual paid compensations and the put-option prices is 2.88 
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percent. This means that 53,83 percent of the compensations paid to the underwriters is 
overcompensation when comparing 2.88 percent to the real guarantee compensations (Table 7). 
There is an overcompensation in 27 of the 33 rights issues on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, which 
means that 6 rights issues or 18 percent of the rights issues made are undervalued. The 
companies in Nasdaq OMX Stockholm also had an average discount of 53 percent. On Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm the underwriters is characterized as big institutions and banks that often have a 
relation to the companies.   
 
The average size of the rights issues made on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm is SEK 1892 Mn, with a 
minimum of SEK 22 Mn and a maximum of SEK 17 634 Mn. The average amount paid in 
compensation for the companies to the underwriters is SEK 48 Mn. If we look at the 
overcompensation in real numbers the companies paid on average SEK 26 Mn to much in 
compensation to the underwriters. 
 
4.2.2 NGM Equity 
 
Table 8 NGM Equity 
  Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option price* 
(P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage of 
compensation fee** 
NGM Equity         
Average 7.41% 10.00% -2.60% -35.09% 
Median 7.74% 2.62% 5.12% 66.15% 
*percentage of guaranteed amount    
**percentage of guarantee 
compensation 
   
 
NGM Equity, which is the smallest sample of the three exchanges with only 9 companies that 
have done rights issues and matched the criteria’s, have completely other values than both 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and AktieTorget. The exchange and the companies in this exchange are 
characterized by using underwriters who mainly are either banks or private investors and often 
there is more than one underwriter for each issue. NGM Equity have on average an 
undervaluation of the compensations paid by the companies of -2.60 percent (Table 8). This 
means that the companies paid -35.09 percent less to the underwriters, when comparing -2.60 to 
guarantee compensation (G), than what they should have done according to the option valuation 
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and if the exchange were effective. The amount of companies that had undervalued 
compensation is 4 out of 9. However these 4 rights issues had considerable undervaluation with 
an average discount between the share and subscription price of as much as 1648 percent. This 
result is much due to a very large discount in one of the issues and if you would take this extreme 
value away the average discount would be 312 percent. 
 
The average size of the rights issues made on the NGM Equity stock exchange was SEK 52 Mn, 
with a minimum of SEK 7 Mn and a maximum value of SEK 226 Mn. With an average of SEK 2 
Mn paid to underwriters from the companies. If we look at the compensation the companies paid 
to the underwriters in real numbers. We see that the companies paid SEK 0.73 Mn too little, on 
average, than what they would have if the price would have been effectively priced. 
 
4.2.3 AktieTorget 
 
Table 9 AktieTorget 
  Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option 
price* (P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage 
of compensation fee** 
AktieTorget       
Average 9.14% 8.64% 0.50% 5.47% 
Median 9.99% 7.70% 2.29% 22.92% 
*percentage of guaranteed amount    
**percentage of guarantee compensation    
 
At AktieTorget, which is the only unregulated of the exchanges in the sample, there are a lot of 
growth companies meaning that a lot of rights issues are made on this exchange. AktieTorget is 
like NGM Equity characterized by using underwriters who are either banks or private investors 
with often more than one underwriter for each issue. There is an overvaluation on this exchange 
just as on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, but the difference between the actually paid compensation 
and the put-option price is not as high as on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. On AktieTorget this 
difference is 0.5 percent, as can be seen in table 9. This means that 5.47 percent of the 
compensation that the companies paid to the underwriters is overcompensation. There is 
overcompensation in 12 of the 23 rights issues made by companies at AktieTorget i.e. 
approximately 50 percent of the companies paid too much for their underwriting agreement. 
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There is further a discount between the share price and the subscription price that is on average 
222 percent. 
 
The average size of the rights issues made at AktieTorget is SEK 17 Mn, where the smallest 
rights issue amount to SEK 2.5 Mn and the biggest SEK 65 Mn. The average amount the 
companies pay in compensation is SEK 1 Mn. When looking at the overcompensation in real 
numbers the companies at AktieTorget pays on average SEK 0.06 Mn too much in compensation 
to the underwriters than they would have if the price was effectively priced. 
 
4.3 Results Divided by Offensive and Defensive Rights Issue 
 
When comparing the offensive and defensive rights issues the authors conducted a t-test on the 
sample. The result from this t-statistics test for offensive and defensive rights issues are t= -
56.713, meaning that the two variables are significantly different from each other. This means 
that it is possible to draw conclusions out of the sample. 
 
Table 10 over offensive and defensive rights issues 
  Guarantee 
compensation* (G) 
Put-option 
price* (P) 
Excess return 
(G-P) 
Excess return as percentage 
of compensation fee** 
Offensive rights issue         
Average 7.32% 6.37% 0.95% 14.44% 
Median 7.01% 4.78% 1.91% 27.30% 
Defensive rights issue         
Average 6.61% 4.98% 1.63% 24.65% 
Median 7.33% 1.25% 3.19% 43.48% 
*percentage of guaranteed 
amount 
       
**percentage of guarantee compensation       
 
4.3.1 Offensive Rights Issue 
 
What the results from the sample show is that offensive rights issues on average means that the 
company pays a compensation that is higher than if it were effectively priced by 0.95 percent. 
This means that 14.44 percent is overcompensation paid by the companies doing a rights issue on 
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offensive grounds (Table 10). As said before the number of offensive rights issues made is 33 (n: 
65). 
 
There is an average size of offensive rights issues made that amounts to SEK 141 Mn, with a 
minimum of SEK 2.5 Mn and a maximum size of SEK 1761 Mn. When companies did an 
offensive rights issue between 2008-2013 they paid on average SEK 4 Mn to the underwriters. 
Further the overcompensation in real numbers when companies did an offensive rights issue was 
SEK 0.64 MN. 
 
4.3.2 Defensive Rights Issue 
 
When looking at the defensive rights issues made between the years 2008-2013 there is a 
difference between them and the offensive rights issues. On average the companies pays 1.63 
percent to much in compensation to the underwriters compared to if it were effectively priced. 
Which means that 24.65 percent of the compensation that is paid out by companies doing an 
defensive rights issue to underwriters is overcompensation (table 10). 
 
The average size of a defensive rights issue amounts to SEK 1833 Mn, with a minimum value of 
SEK 3.5 Mn and a maximum of SEK 27682 Mn. The companies making a defensive rights issue 
during this period pay on average a compensation of SEK 46 Mn to the underwriters. The 
overcompensation that the companies pays to underwriter’s amount in real numbers to SEK 11.5 
Mn. 
 
4.3.3 Difference Between Offensive and Defensive 
 
When comparing the values of a defensive rights issue with the values of an offensive rights 
issue we can see that there is a difference between what the companies paid the underwriters in 
real numbers that amounts to almost SEK 11 Mn. Meaning that on average a defensive rights 
issue is more expensive than an offensive rights issue. This relation is true even when the 
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maximum and minimum numbers for the two are taken away although the amount then goes 
down to approximately SEK 3 Mn.  
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5. Analysis 
 
In this chapter the empirical evidence are analyzed by applying the relevant theories to the 
sample used in this study. This discussion leads into the conclusions which are presented in 
chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Valuation of Underwriting Agreements 
 
The empirical findings in this study show that the rights issue market in Sweden are not 
effectively priced. From the result, there is a difference between the real compensation fee that 
the companies paid to the underwriters and the option-based compensation fee they should have 
paid if the market was effectively priced. This means that the majority of the companies in 
Sweden are paying too much when they make use of underwriters in their rights issues. This 
result is in line with the result in Marsh (1980) and Handley (1995) as well as other studies 
(Cooney et al, 2003; Breedon & Twinn, 1995), which all show evidence of an excess 
compensation paid by the companies to the underwriters. Marsh (1980) not only sees this as the 
markets inefficiency but also as a result of the presence of side payments and other factors that 
should be taken into consideration. What is important to emphasize though, is that the excess 
return in our study is smaller than what most of the previous studies have shown. This is 
something that might mean that the market for underwriters is getting more effective the more 
mature it gets. For instance when looking at the results from different studies compared to this 
study, it is possible to see that the compensations have gone down. Marsh (1980) found excess 
return of 63 percent (UK) and 98.7 percent (US) as a percentage of the compensation fee, while 
Handley (1995) found this number to be 49 percent (Australia) and in this study the same 
number is 18.34 percent. Although these studies are for different markets there seems to be a 
downward trend. Why there might be a more mature and stable market ahead with more 
effectively priced underwriting agreements for the companies. 
 
The presence of excess returns on the market for underwriters is something that is important for 
companies to take into consideration when they set the compensation. When the underwriters 
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feel that they take more risk they most likely want a higher compensation, which makes it 
important for the companies to have some sort of valuation or benchmark for finding the correct 
compensation to pay in accordance with the actual risk. Furthermore, as the compensation often 
is a fixed fee it is mostly the terms of the issue and the subscription price that can be negotiated.  
 
When making a robust test for volatility, the results appear to be robust. As the volatility is the 
only variable that cannot be directly observed in the data, it is important that there are no big 
differences when making the test. This is why a robustness check for a volatility of 30 days is 
made with the sample data. As this test yielded a result that differed by not more than a couple of 
percentage points16 from the 90 days volatility there is no alterations made on the result. 
 
5.2 Cluster Analysis 
5.2.1 Exchange Cluster 
 
When looking at the different exchanges it is interesting to see if companies listed on different 
exchanges pay different amount of compensation fees. As the exchanges differ in the type of 
companies listed on them, it is interesting to see whether this can be an influencing factor. 
Looking at the result in different exchanges is something that has not been done in other studies 
on the subject before. Therefore, the authors find it extra interesting to make this cluster division.   
 
When looking at the cluster that is divided between exchanges there is a higher excess return in 
the sample for Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, an exchange where there are predominantly big 
companies that is mature or at least not at the beginning of their life, compared to the companies 
at NGM equity and AktieTorget which predominantly consists of smaller start-up companies that 
mainly needs the cash in order to grow. As there are many big companies on Nasdaq OMX 
Stockholm that variable might be a reason for the higher compensations compared to the 
compensations at NGM Equity and AktieTorget. This could mean that big companies, like those 
on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, do larger rights issues which could be a reason for paying 
underwriters higher relative amounts of compensation fees. This argumentation is in line with 
                                                 
16 As calculated by percentage of excess return to compensations paid. 
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Marsh (1980), as discussed before, that says that there are other costs to take into account when 
analyzing rights issues. Marsh (1980) says that there are considerable administrative costs and 
side-payments that a company, if the rights issue were to fail, are bound to pay and need to pay 
again if the company would try to make yet another rights issue. To hedge the company from this 
risk it might be motivated for the company to pay the underwriters their required compensation, 
even when it is a bit too high, so they secure the rights issue rather than to expose themselves to 
the risk of making a rights issue again. Although this study show evidence of higher 
compensation in large rights issues, Handley (1995) argues that a large rights issue cannot 
explain why there is excess return. However, the data and sample in this study shows that there is 
more excess return to the underwriters on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm than on the other two 
exchanges where smaller companies with smaller rights issues are listed. 
 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm is the exchange that has the lowest discount between the share price 
and the subscription price. NGM Equity and AktieTorget both have discounts with triple digits in 
this percentage while Nasdaq OMX Stockholm has around a 53 percent discount. There is a 
difference between both NGM Equity, AktieTorget and Nasdaq OMX Stockholm in that the 
latter have the highest excess return to underwriters and the two others have either low excess 
return like AktieTorget or no excess return like NGM Equity. This shows of a relationship 
between excess return for underwriters and a small discount for companies, i.e. when companies 
have a smaller discount they tend to have higher compensations to underwriters. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the underwriter takes on more risk when there is a low discount in the rights 
issue. A low discount is often seen as there is a higher probability that the rights issue might not 
be fully subscribed and the underwriter would be forced to buy the shares that are not sold, in 
order to honor his agreement. This result is the same that Cooney et al (2003) found in their 
study i.e. that a lower discount means higher excess return for the compensation fee the 
companies pay to the underwriters.   
 
The values from the sample for NGM Equity during the years 2008-2013 says that companies 
actually paid too little to the underwriters than what they should if the market were effectively 
priced. So it is possible to say that the companies on NGM Equity did not have as much risk as 
the companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm or AktieTorget. Why this might be the case 
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could be for several reasons. First, one reason can be that the discounts between the share price 
and the subscription price on this exchange tend to be very high. A high discount takes away 
much of the risk for the company that the issue might not get fully subscribed and this might be 
the reason why the underwriters gets paid less on this exchange. This is in line with Cooney et al 
(2003) and Handley (1995) who finds that a high discount means lower excess return for the 
underwriter due to the signaling effect. Cooney et al (2003) mean that because of the fact that 
when companies set the subscription price at a high discount, they believe that the rights issue 
has a bigger chance to get fully subscribed and therefore do not have any incentive to pay high 
compensations to the underwriters, this is something this study finds as well. Although this is 
good for the companies in the sense that they do not pay as much to the underwriters they can 
leave significant amount of money on the table, meaning that if they were to take a higher 
subscription price they would get in more money from the rights issue. Another explanation for 
this undervaluation can be that there is a large price uncertainty for the rights issues made on this 
exchange, which makes the underpricing higher, this argument have support from the study 
made by Bae and Levy (1990). However, the result for NGM Equity cannot be fully applicable 
as the sample size is fairly small with mere nine companies. Four of them are undervalued in the 
put-option price giving the average result in this specific exchange a bit skewed numbers. 
 
AktieTorget is the exchange in Sweden that during the years 2008-2013 actually had the most 
effectively priced compensation fees with an excess return of 5.47 percent of the compensation 
fee. This is about the same values as in the study by Bae and Levy (1990) who also found 
competitively priced markets in their study. This is an interesting result as there are many smaller 
and younger companies on this exchange, then one might think that they do not have much to say 
in light of bargaining power about the compensation fees paid. Although they might be small 
there has been a tendency that these companies use more private investors when they use 
underwriters. This is something that might mean that bigger investors and institutions have more 
power to take higher compensations than smaller underwriters. However, this is not that strange 
as one big investor or institution have a higher risk than what many smaller investors have in a 
shared underwriting agreement and thus demand a higher risk premia, as that investor has no risk 
diversification. 
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Furthermore it seems like the results in our sample is much in line with the overall result for 
Marsh (1980). The authors as well as Marsh found that although bigger companies might have 
more bargaining power and more financially refined solutions there seems to be an opposite 
result. The results show that the smaller companies, the ones on NGM Equity and AktieTorget, 
have more competitive priced underwriting agreements than the bigger companies at Nasdaq 
OMX Stockholm. This means that there is more than just the size of a company or the size of the 
rights issue that decides the compensation fee.  
 
5.2.1.1 Signaling and Pecking Order Analysis    
 
The signaling theory can be applied to the data in this study as there is more excess return in the 
sample for Nasdaq OMX Stockholm where bigger companies mainly are listed. Armitage (2002) 
looked at the UK market for signaling when using underwriters, where he found no evidence that 
underwriters are used for signaling a positive outcome to the market. The underwriting 
agreement is rather used as a mean to get all the shares subscribed. Cooney et al (2003) find that 
there is a positive return surrounding the announcement of a rights issue and on the put-values 
for the rights issues. One of the reasons that Nasdaq OMX Stockholm use underwriters can be 
that they need to certify that the rights issue is fully subscribed, due to the reasons for making a 
rights issue often is that the money cannot be raised internally or funded by debt. Since the 
companies on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, that makes a rights issue, are mainly mature and they 
cannot raise capital internally or by debt this can be met with skepticism from investors. So by 
using underwriters to certify and signal to investors the rights issue’s strength they can get away 
from the negative announcement effect discussed by Armitage (2002). Although they can 
somewhat eliminate this negative effect the companies on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm also use 
reputable firms to a large extent when making a rights issue. When companies use reputable 
firms and banks this has shown to further increase the excess return and can be a reason why 
companies on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm pay higher compensations to underwriters. This result is 
in line with Handley (1995) who also found this relationship in his study. 
 
This is something that does not seem to be a problem in the other exchanges NGM Equity and 
AktieTorget as the latter hardly have any excess return and NGM Equity does not have any 
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excess return at all. This is strange as they have high discounts in both of these exchanges and a 
high discount signals that the share is overvalued (Armitage, 2002). This is probably mainly 
though because the announcement effect or signaling effect surrounding the announcement is not 
incorporated in the valuation, in order to not contaminate the result. Further these exchanges 
have much smaller companies that do not get as affected by the effects the signaling theory 
usually have as compared to the companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm.  
 
5.2.2 Offensive and Defensive Cluster 
 
When the sample is divided and tested for significance between offensive and defensive rights 
issues there is a statistically significant difference between the two. The result shows that the 
defensive rights issues have higher compensation fees to the underwriters than the offensive 
rights issues. This means that when a company makes a rights issue that is driven by the inability 
to pay back debt or solve other financial troubles that a company can have, they tend to have 
higher compensation fees to their underwriters, in comparison to companies that makes an 
offensive rights issue. This extra risk-premia that companies who are in a defensive position pay 
for their underwriters service is a premia that most certainly stems from the extra risk the 
underwriter see in the rights issue, for example bigger risk that the rights issue are not be fully 
subscribed. This result is most likely due to the fact that when the underwriter sees that there is 
more risk he, with most certainty, demands a higher compensation, while at the same time a 
company making a defensive rights issue are in a bad negotiating position as they often are in 
serious need for money. 
 
The difference between compensation fees in a defensive and offensive rights issue can further 
be seen as a signaling effect. A company that makes a defensive rights issue need an underwriter 
who have a good reputation and are willing to take on the agreement. The company may then 
have to pay a little extra in order to get the positive signal the best choice of underwriter sends to 
the shareholders. Although Handley (1995) could not conclude that the reputation of the 
underwriter has an effect on the excess compensation in an agreement, it might have an effect on 
the share-price and also the underwriters own reputation (Armitage, 2002). Since the 
underwriters own reputation can be at stake the excess compensation fee can be a result of other 
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costs as well. For instance in some rights issues sub-underwriters is used and the extra cost 
associated with this insurance is put on the issuing company as Marsh (1980) and Armitage 
(2002) suggests. 
 
Further in a defensive rights issue the rational investor would, if they think the money is going to 
be used to pay back debt, not subscribe to the shares as it is not going to make their wealth 
increase. This mean that if investors are rational they do not subscribe for their part of the shares 
if the money are going to be used for paying back debt as this is not going to increase their 
wealth (Brealey et al, 2011). So when the companies’ shareholders are not willing to subscribe 
and as the market see a rights issue as a weak signal according to the signaling theory there are 
no other way to get the rights issue fully subscribed than by using an underwriter (Connelly et al, 
2011). Today the easiest way to get around this problem might be to pay the underwriter a higher 
compensation. However, it is these companies, which are in financial distress, that suffer the 
most from paying too much in compensation. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the authors draw conclusions from the previous chapter as well as describe what 
the study’s result is and what it means. The chapter also shares some thoughts about further 
research that can be conducted in the area. 
 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
 
On average, the companies making rights issues on the Swedish market pay underwriters a 
compensation fee of 6.98 percent of the guaranteed amount. This correspond to an overcharge of 
18.34 percent of the compensation fee as the option valuation and price the company should pay 
if the market was effectively priced is 5.69 percent. At a cluster level, efficient pricing could be 
found on the exchange AktieTorget but not at Nasdaq OMX Stockholm or the smaller exchange 
NGM equity, where Nasdaq OMX Stockholm showed result of overpricing and NGM Equity 
underpricing. The overall results indicate that it is profitable to take the role as an underwriter for 
rights issues on the Swedish market. However, it is important to highlight that about 32 percent 
of the surveyed underwriting agreements are underpriced which means that the underwriters 
were not paid for the risk they were exposed to and the issuing company obtained a risk 
reduction greater than what they paid for. The study shows that to obtain efficient pricing, based 
on an option pricing perspective, there is a need to take the rights issue discount into 
consideration when deciding the right compensation. It is also important to incorporate the 
signaling effect the discount has on the rights issue. Further the authors emphasize the difficulty 
to estimate an accurate volatility, which underscores that the correct compensation should be 
seen as an interval. There is further a difference in the compensation fees whether it is an 
offensive or a defensive rights issue. On average, it is more expensive to make use of an 
underwriter in a defensive rights issue than in an offensive rights issue. The compensation paid 
in defensive rights issues show also a higher excess return for the underwriter; this result is 
furthermore statistically significant. 
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The results of this study show that the underwriters, on average, have received overpriced 
compensations to take the role as the underwriter. This result is consistent with what previous 
studies have found in their result on the UK-, Australian- and Japanese-market. For the US 
market, there have been diverging results in previous studies as the empirical evidence is 
available for both efficient and inefficient pricing. 
 
From 2008 to 2013, private investors, institutions and banks have been compensated in excess to 
take the role as underwriters. As the authors mentioned in the analysis, this may be because it is a 
relatively new phenomenon in the Swedish market and because of the fact that the market has 
not become mature enough to adapt to efficient prices. This is something companies need to pay 
attention to as these extra costs, in almost each rights issue, affect the small shareholders in the 
company. When the big banks and wealthy investors have almost a monopoly in the 
underwriting market, they are those who also are the ones who set the prices. It is now up to the 
company’s management and board to be aware of this and think more about if a guarantee truly 
provides the risk reduction and benefits the companies are looking for. The cost of underwriting 
agreements is therefore something that needs to be emphasized and something that the authors 
think should be a decision that should be taken together with the shareholders. 
 
6.2 Future Research 
 
After reviewing the relevant literature and conducting this study the authors see that there are 
more to be done in this subject. For instance, the authors chose to focus on the Swedish market 
as there were no such previous studies conducted. The aim was to look at the years between 
2008-2013 and see if the compensation was as high in Sweden as in other international markets. 
What could be interesting is also to see if these results would differ with another time horizon on 
the Swedish market. This would further enlighten this markets’ evolution and there can be 
possibilities to see how the compensation fees have changed with time on the Swedish market. 
Although the data can be hard to find historical volatilities and share prices, it could say 
something about the maturity of the market in Sweden. 
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It could also be interesting to test what variables that are affecting the excess return further than 
the option variables used, i.e. look at what other factors might drive the compensation to the 
underwriters beyond the option variables. As there is a significant difference between offensive 
and defensive rights issues, there might for instance be a correlation between the debt in a 
company and the compensation this company pays to the underwriter. In a similar matter it might 
be interesting to see if the size of a company and the compensation paid to underwriters has 
some explanatory value. By doing this there can be further discussion concerning these issues 
and what companies should think about when paying an underwriters’ compensation. Another 
interesting variable to look at is the number of underwriters a company uses. This combined with 
for instance the relationship between the company and underwriter as Handley (1995) looked at, 
can be a good measure for further understanding of underwriting agreements and the 
compensations related to them.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Appendix 1 
 
Companies used in the study and the year they made a rights issue 
 
Year Company 
2008 Fingerprint cards AB 
2008 IBS AB 
2009 Eniro 
2009 Fingerprint cards AB 
2009 SEB 
2009 Husqvarna 
2009 Nordea AB 
2009 Swedbank AB 
2009 Tradedoubler 
2009 Guideline Oil Drilling 
2009 Guideline Technology AB 
2009 Paynova 
2009 Accelerator 
2009 Miris 
2010 Karo Bio AB 
2010 Oasmia Pharma AB 
2010 PA Resources AB 
2010 Rörvik Timber AB 
2010 SAS AB 
2010 Central Asia Gold (Auriant Mining AB) 
2010 Commodity Quest AB 
2010 Accelerator 
2010 Scirocco 
2010 Vitanova (A+ sceince) 
2011 Digital vision (image system) 
2011 Kappahl AB 
2011 Orexo AB 
2011 Precise biometrics AB 
2011 Swedish orphan biovitrum AB 
2011 Transcom AB 
2011 Confidence International AB 
2011 LifeAssays AB 
2011 Panaxia 
2011 24H Technologies AB (Mavshack AB) 
2011 Commodity Quest 
2011 Deflamo 
2011 HQ AB 
2011 Medicpen AB 
2011 A+ 
2011 Star Vault AB 
2011 Värmlands Finans 
2012 Karo Bio AB 
2012 Nordic Mines AB 
2012 Oasmia Pharma AB 
2012 Precise biometrics AB 
2012 Botnia 
2012 NeuroVive 
2012 Polyplank 
2012 Ironroad 
2013 Anoto Group AB 
2013 Bioinvent AB 
2013 Bong 
2013 CDON Group AB 
2013 Image Systems AB 
2013 Nordic Mines AB 
2013 Opus Group AB 
2013 Precise biometrics AB 
2013 Retail and Brands AB 
2013 Glycorex 
2013 Botnia Exploration AB 
2013 Cefour Wine and Beverage AB 
2013 Cortus Energy 
2013 Guldadam Holding AB 
2013 Hexatronic Scandinavia AB 
2013 Miris Holding AB 
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8.2 Appendix 2 
 
A list over which companies had the ten highest compensations to their underwriters. 
Year Company Size of the issue Mn SEK Underwriters compensation Mn SEK 
2009 Nordea AB 27682 860 
2009 SEB 15070 223 
2009 Eniro 2517 76 
2010 SAS AB 4959 73 
2009 Swedbank AB 1501 73 
2010 PA Resources AB 1761 63 
2009 Husqvarna 3059 59 
2010 Rörvik Timber AB 249 20 
2013 Retail and Brands AB 463 16 
2013 Nordic Mines AB 282 13 
 
Companies that paid the ten highest excess returns to underwriters 
Year Company Diff price & put in 
percentage points 
2012 Botnia 17,95% 
2011 Deflamo 11,75% 
2013 Image Systems AB 9,76% 
2013 Anoto Group AB 8,97% 
2010 Scirocco 8,48% 
2011 Digital vision (image system) 8,41% 
2013 Cefour Wine and Beverage AB 7,94% 
2010 Rörvik Timber AB 7,84% 
2011 Commodity Quest 7,71% 
2010 Commodity Quest AB 7,65% 
 
 
